I am a dog lover. Anyone who knows me to any degree knows this. I sometimes think that there are lessons to be learned from our four legged friends. Thus, when I saw that the California Supreme Court decided a dog bite case in favor of the dog, I had to read and comment on it. In Priebe v. Nelson, (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 1112, the California Supreme Court held that Plaintiff Marta Priebe, a commercial kennel worker whose foot and ankle were mauled by Mugsey, one of her charges (a pit bull) who was boarding at the kennel, could not recover damages from Mugsy’s owner, Russell Nelson. Even though California has a strict liability statute covering dogs that bite – Civil Code §3342 - the California Supreme Court held that the statute did not apply due to the “veterinarian’s rule” which, in essence, is an “occupational assumption of risk” rule. That is, given the nature of Priebe’s occupation and employment as a kennel worker, she, like the veterinarian, had assumed the risk of being bitten by dogs while “on the job.” As a result, the owner of the dog – Russell Nelson – was exempted from liability under this statute (although he may still face common law strict liability for Mugsey’s proclivities).
The Supreme Court based its decision on various public policies. One of these, borrowed from the Louisiana Court of Appeal, applied a “risk-utility balancing test” analyzing which was more important: the unreasonable risk of harm to a plaintiff from a dog that might bite or “the utility of allowing dog owners to board their pets and have trained technicians care for the animal while the owner is out of town.” (Id. at 24).
The Louisiana Court of Appeal thought it more important or that it would further serve public policy to encourage dog owners to use licensed commercial dog kennels without the threat of liability than to allow suits for damages in such situations.
So. . .you ask – what does this have to do with mediation? Not much really except for the notion of “public policy.” Like the veterinarian rule exempting the dog owner from the “dog bite statute,” mediation has its exemptions predicated on public policy. First and foremost is confidentiality. While everything else about the dispute may be public knowledge, the mediation is not. Nothing can be disclosed outside of the mediation absent consent of the parties. Even the fact of the mediation cannot be referred to in a subsequent trial (California Evidence Code §1128). Most importantly, the mediator normally cannot be compelled to testify or produce a writing regarding the mediation: both her lips and writing tablet are sealed. (California Evidence Code §§ 703.5 and 1127.)
What is the public policy behind this? The California legislative extensively set it out in California Civil Code §1775 (operative January 1, 1999):
(a) The peaceful resolution of disputes in a fair, timely, appropriate, and cost-effective manner is an essential function of the judicial branch. . .
(b) In the case of many disputes, litigation culminating in a trial is costly, time consuming, and stressful for the parties involved. Many disputes can be resolved in a fair and equitable manner through less formal processes.
(c) Alternative processes for reducing the cost, time, and stress of dispute resolution, such as mediation, have been effectively used in California and elsewhere. In appropriate cases mediation provides parties with a simplified and economical procedure for obtaining prompt and equitable resolution of their disputes and a greater opportunity to participate directly in resolving these disputes. Mediation may also assist to reduce the backlog of cases burdening the judicial system. It is in the public interest for mediation to be encouraged and used where appropriate by the courts.
(d) Mediation and similar alternative processes can have the greatest benefit for the parties in a civil action when used early, before substantial discovery and other litigation costs have been incurred. Where appropriate, participants in disputes should be encouraged to utilize mediation and other alternatives to trial for resolving their differences in the early stages of a civil action.
. . .
(f) The purpose of this title is to encourage the use of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution methods in general, and mediation in particular. It is estimated that the average cost to the court for processing a civil case of the kind described in Section 1775.3 through judgment is three thousand nine hundred forty-three dollars ($3,943) for each judge day, and that a substantial portion of this cost can be saved if these cases are resolved before trial. . . .
In sum, the public policies behind mediation are to save time and money, and avoid stress in a fair, timely, cost-effective and efficient manner.
So. . .the next time someone asks you if you are interested in going to mediation
. . . say “yes,” if only to support “public policy.”
. . . Just something to ponder.